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INTRODUCTION

W

ith a rising reputation for violent homophobia and an
equally disturbing record of homophobic violence, the
Caribbean—its music and its culture—seems to grow less synonymous with Bob Marley’s lyrical “one love” and more reminiscent of hate. International human rights advocates seeking
to safeguard the human rights of sexual minorities in the Caribbean have come to expect cultural resistance from government leaders, perpetrators of human rights abuses, and even
local populations. The Caribbean’s apprehension to Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex (“LGBTI”) 1 rights advocacy
is deeply rooted in the region’s tragically oppressive colonial
experience, and often advocates disparage this cultural resistance as a cumbersome and irritating barrier to ensuring
human rights. As an initial matter, this paper recognizes the
value of cultural resistance and presupposes the region’s apprehension to be a healthy and indispensable survival mecha* Staff Attorney and Human Rights Working Group Member, Maryland Legal Aid; Georgetown University Law Center Women’s Law and Public Policy
Fellow, 2011 – 2012. B.A., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., Temple University, Beasley School of Law; Master of Arts – Economics, Temple University,
Fox School of Business. The author thanks William M. Carter, Jaya RamjiNogales, Macarena Saez, O. Hilaire Sobers, and the Latina and Latino Critical Legal Theory, Inc. community for their mentorship and insightful feedback. Many thanks to the editors of the Brooklyn Journal of International
Law for their thoughtful edits.
1. The acronym LGBTI is used throughout the article. It is intended to
include other variations of the acronym, such as, LGBTQ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, Queer/Questioning), and other sexual minorities.
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nism. Having been enslaved, inhumanely subordinated, and
stripped of its dignity, the Caribbean simply must guard its
autonomy closely. To be effective, human rights advocates must
respect the region’s autonomy, and instead of attempting to
subdue this cultural resistance, advocates must strategize efforts that take account for cultural sensitivities and resistances. This article proposes one such strategy—the use of regional
bodies to advance LGBTI rights in the Caribbean.
This Article considers the use of regional bodies as an avenue
for advancing LGBTI rights in the Caribbean, and more broadly, the use of regional bodies for advancing other culturally
charged human rights advocacy. The purpose of this Article is
not to glorify the Caribbean’s regional bodies, but rather to be
purely pragmatic—it responds to the challenges facing international LGBTI advocates seeking to make real change on the
ground and thereby safeguard the fundamental human rights
of LGBTI communities in the Caribbean.
Part I of the Article demonstrates the importance of LGBTI
human rights advocacy in the Caribbean by taking stock of the
dire and often worsening realities for LGBTI communities in
the Caribbean. Part II gives the reader a broader context within which to consider the arguments advanced by discussing
other manifestations of culturally charged human rights abuse
and the accompanying philosophical debate around cultural
relativism and universalism. Parts III and IV discuss the inadequacies of direct advocacy targeting LGBTI hostile states and
the shortcomings of global LGBTI advocacy, respectively. Part
V demonstrates the advantages of employing regional bodies to
advance LGBTI rights in the Caribbean. Part VI addresses the
anticipated counter-argument against regionalism—the concern for regional insularism, which theoretically may allow the
region to insulate itself against outside interference and thereby become even more entrenched in its homophobic ways and
immune to outside advocacy efforts. Part VII of the Article proposes avenues for international advocates to support LGBTI
human rights through regional entities in the Caribbean. Finally, Part VIII recognizes the limitations of the research and
concludes.
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I. CURRENT STATE OF LGBTI RIGHTS IN THE CARIBBEAN
LGBTI movements in Latin America have reportedly enjoyed
an “astonishing record” of recent success.2 However, despite
Latin America’s success, its regional neighbors in the Caribbean have seen less progress for LGBTI communities.3 At least
thirteen of the Caribbean Community’s (“CARICOM”) fifteen
states continue to criminalize same-sex conduct under antisodomy statutes, and the region shows particular resistance to
any foreign suggestions to repeal these laws.4 In addition to
clinging to its homophobic laws, the Caribbean continues to resist any social or cultural human rights advocacy.5 To exacerbate the problem, as sexual freedoms in the Caribbean and the
wider global south continue to suffer, the resources necessary
for defending human rights are dwindling.6
Homophobia in the Caribbean manifests itself in at least
three contemporary modalities: law, music, and mob violence.
Many former colonial territories in the Caribbean retain a colonial legacy of the British Imperial anti-sodomy law.7 For example, sections 76, 77, and 79 of the Jamaican Offences against
the Person Act are derived from the British Imperial law and
criminalize sex between consenting adult men.8 This colonial
legacy will be discussed further in subsequent sections. The
region’s characteristic reggae music has gained notoriety for its
homophobic lyrical content, which sometimes advocates violence against the LGBTI community.9 Many reggae artists
have been boycotted by international rights groups and in some
cases the music genre has itself been blacklisted.10
2. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TOGETHER, APART: ORGANIZING AROUND SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY WORLDWIDE 34 (2009) [hereinafter
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TOGETHER, APART].
3. See id. at 41.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 5.
7. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THIS ALIEN LEGACY: THE ORIGINS
OF “SODOMY” LAWS IN BRITISH COLONIALISM (2008) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, THIS ALIEN LEGACY].
8. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TOGETHER, APART, supra note 2, at 1.
9. See Camille A. Nelson, Lyrical Assault: Dancehall versus the Cultural
Imperialism of the North-West, 17 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 231 (2008) (discussing the homophobic nature of Jamaica’s music industry).
10. See Join GLAAD in Calling on the Recording Academy to Denounce
Music
that
Promotes
Murder,
GLAAD
(Jan.
29,
2010),
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Of greatest concern to LGBTI rights advocates are the frequent instances of violence against LGBTI persons in the Caribbean. In Jamaica, homophobic violence has increased and the
government has often espoused an apologist view, permitting
homophobic violence to continue unchecked.11 A 2004 Human
Rights Watch report documented numerous accounts of mob
violence against perceived gay Jamaicans, noting that instead
of protecting victims of violence, the Jamaican police force
sometimes participates in the violence.12 For example, one afternoon in 2004, a mob chased and reportedly chopped,
stabbed, and stoned to death a suspected gay man.13 Nearby
police officers first beat the victim with batons and then urged
others to beat him as well.14
II. A BROADER DISCUSSION OF CULTURALLY CHARGED HUMAN
RIGHTS ADVOCACY
This Article advocates the use of regional bodies as an avenue
for furthering LGBTI rights in the Caribbean. Importantly,
this Article sits within a broader realm of literature concerning
culturally charged human rights advocacy toward the global
south and human rights abuses perpetrated in the name of culture. The next few paragraphs explore the intersection of human rights abuses and cultural norms by honing in on two controversial cultural practices: female circumcision and stoning.
At the outset, the competing notions of cultural relativism
and universalism must be addressed. The universalist school of
thought embraces a baseline set of human rights principles
from which no cultural or religious group may deviate.15 For
http://www.glaad.org/action/join-glaad-calling-recording-academy-denouncemusic-promotes-murder. See also Stephen Jackson, Reggae Artistes BlacklistOBSERVER
(Feb.
28,
2010),
ed,
JAMAICA
http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/entertainment/Artistes-blacklisted—
SUNDAY (noting that Germany blacklisted at least 11 dancehall albums between 2008 and 2010 because of their homophobic and violent content).
11. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TOGETHER, APART, supra note 2, at 41.
12. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 16 HATED TO DEATH: HOMOPHOBIA, VIOLENCE
AND JAMAICA’S HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC, 18 (2004).
13. Id. at 20.
14. Id. at 20.
15. Ann-Belinda S. Preis, Human Rights as Cultural Practice: An Anthropological Critique, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 286, 288 (1996) (citing Jack Donnelly,
Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytical Critique of Non-Western
Conceptions of Human Rights, 76 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 303, 306 (1992)).
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universalist advocates, instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Universal Declaration”) symbolize
a fundamental baseline of inalienable rights.16
Opposite the universalist doctrine sits the cultural relativist
camp, which emphasizes the right to cultural and religious autonomy, even if that autonomy protects practices that would
otherwise be considered human rights abuses.17 At its extreme,
this doctrine holds that cultural variations are exempt from
legitimate criticism by persons outside that particular cultural
group.18 Cultural relativists typically view instruments such as
the Universal Declaration to be non-universal and mere codifications of distinctively Western and Judeo-Christian cultural
biases.19 Cultural relativists regularly accuse universalists of
imposing neo-imperialist standards on non-Western communities and thereby re-dominating developing nations by imposing
yet another set of alien norms.20 Whereas universalists can be
expected to label the cultural relativists as apologist and ineffective in tackling human rights abuses.
Consider now the application of both schools of thought to the
harsh and often fatal realities of female circumcision and stoning practices. Female circumcision and stoning practices force
advocates to strategize efforts to address human rights abuses
when these abuses are carried out in the name of religious or
cultural freedom.
Turning to the issue of female circumcision,21 gender rights
advocates and universalists advocate for the elimination of the

16. Id.
17. Aquila Mazzinghy Alvarenga, Who Cares about the Rights of Indigenous Children? Infanticide in Brazilian Tribes, 22 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 17,
30 (2011).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Erika R. George, Virginity Testing and South Africa’s HIV/AIDS Crisis: Beyond Rights Universalism and Cultural Relativism toward Health Capabilities, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1447, 1468 (2008).
21. Zsaleh E. Harivandi, Invisible and Involuntary: Female Genital Mutilation as a Basis for Asylum, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 599, 601 (2010) (defining
female circumcision as the practice of cutting the genitalia of women and
girls). Note that the term is a loaded one as it is usually used by proponents
of the practice. Other terms, such as ‘genital mutilation’ or ‘female genital
cutting’ refer to the same practice and are used by opponents of the practice.
Because this Article’s focus is pragmatic and not ideological, the use of ‘female circumcision’ does not imply that the practice is or should be accepted.
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practice, holding it to be in direct contravention of fundamental
human rights.22 However, the practice continues to be defended
largely on the grounds of cultural identity, custom, and indigenous traditions.23 The universalist approach to targeting genital mutilation has been largely ineffective because of its hardline stance against the practice. For example, when the United
Nations initiated a campaign to address genital mutilation in
the 1980s, the Inter-Africa Committee (“the Committee”) was
formed from among twenty-one African states with the purpose
of abolishing the practice.24 The Committee’s hard stance
against the practice rendered its efforts fruitless.25 Even upon
its formation, the Committee was warned against “untimely
haste, which would result in rash legal measures that would
never be enforced.”26 Subsequently, a majority of the Committee’s measures have failed.27
The experience of the Committee is not uncommon; the World
Health Organization and the United Nations Children’s Fund
(“UNICEF”) re-ignited the Committee’s efforts in 1997 by issuing a joint statement calling upon states parties to take all effective and appropriate measures to abolish the practice.28 Following the statement, the U.N. issued a three-year campaign to
eliminate the practice in 1998.29 Like the Inter-Africa Committee, these efforts were largely ineffective—in some cases the
sweeping statements against circumcision had no impact, but
in other countries the campaign incited defensiveness and protest.30
22. See, e.g., World Health Organization Fact Sheet No. 241—Female Genital Mutilation, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs241/en/ (last
visited Mar. 26, 2013) In this fact sheet, the WHO seems to take the universalist approach, stating “FGM is a violation of the human rights of girls and
women.”
23. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, WHAT IS FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION? §1, 4–
5 (1997).
24. Susan A. Dillon, Comment, Healing the Sacred Yoni in the Land of Isis:
Female Genital Mutilation is Banned (again) in Egypt, 22 HOUS. J. INT’L L.
289, 300 (2000).
25. Kirsten Bowman, Bridging the Gap in the Hopes of Ending Female
Genital Cutting, 3 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 132, 154 (2005).
26. Dillon, supra note 24, at 300.
27. Bowman, supra note 25, at 154.
28. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, ELIMINATING FEMALE GENITAL
MUTILATION: AN INTERAGENCY STATEMENT 3, 8 (2008).
29. Dillon, supra note 24, at 301.
30. Bowman, supra note 25, at 154–55.
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However, the cultural relativist camp cannot be credited with
any more success in the struggle to safeguard the rights of
women in communities practicing female circumcision. One advocate for the organization Women Living Under Muslim Laws
critiqued the relativist position, pointing out that “everything
can be tolerated in the name of culture.”31 One scholar notes
that cultural relativism can be, and has been, employed to defend torture, slavery, and other now-universally disparaged
human rights abuses.32 In short, the strategy of cultural relativists is more or less a non-strategy, since these advocates, at
their extreme, believe that cultures have the right to exist in a
vacuum, without outside interference. Moreover, cultural relativism perceives culture to be a static concept that must be preserved in its original form in order to retain authenticity. However, anthropologists agree that cultural norms are dynamic
systems that are no less authentic despite their evolution to
embrace human rights norms.33 In fact, many communities
that once practiced female circumcision now denounce the
practice.34 Therefore, the experience of female circumcision advocates evidences the need for a more nuanced advocacy strategy toward safeguarding culturally charged human rights.
Stoning practices offer a similar example. In several Muslim
communities, death by stoning is a legitimate punishment for
religious offenses, most often adultery.35 The punishment is exacted in what is likely the harshest manner imaginable. The
offender is often a woman accused of having an extramarital

31. Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1438 (2003).
32. Jerome J. Shestack, Globalization of Human Rights Law, 21 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 558, 567 (1997).
33. Id. See also Amber Rose Maltbie, When the Veil and the Vote Collide:
Enhancing Muslim Women’s Rights Through Electoral Reform, 41 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 967, 967 (2010) (“In the last two decades, centuries-old monarchies in
the Middle East have begun to shift toward more open societies by integrating democratic rights into their laws. In an exciting move by a number of
these parliaments and monarchs, women have been granted suffrage
throughout the region. Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, and, to a limited extent, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have each granted suffrage to women
since the beginning of the Twenty-First Century.”).
34. Mark D. Kielsgard, Critiquing Cultural Relativism: A Fresh View from
the New Haven School of Jurisprudence, 42 CUMB. L. REV. 441, 471 (2011–
2012).
35. Id. (noting that stoning is still a legal form of capital punishment in
some states).
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affair or conducting another form of intimate betrayal, purportedly against her husband, family, and community.36 The
woman is brought to an open area, a town square, sporting
arena, or marketplace and lowered into a hole in the ground.
Only her head remains exposed.37 Onlookers, sometimes including the woman’s father, brothers, cousins, uncles, and
neighbors, are invited to implement God’s punishment by hurling rocks at her head until she is lifeless.38
Communities that engage in stoning defend the practice on
the grounds of religious and cultural autonomy, and will readily demonstrate the procedural and systematic judicial mechanisms through which guilt is determined and punishment is
exacted.39 In some instances, female community members endorse the practice; one scholar noted that even mothers whose
daughters had been stoned to death expressed no remorse, believing that their daughters deserved their fatal punishment.40
Universalists take a strict stance against honor killings, denouncing the practice as intolerable in all instances and advocating for a categorical ban against the practice as a violation
of the universal principles of human rights. This sweeping advocacy, although brave and resolute, may ultimately prove ineffective. The drafting of the Universal Declaration gives us an
example of such sweeping advocacy, and the aversion of Muslim leaders to the instrument illustrates the ineffectiveness of a
hardline advocacy strategy. During the drafting of the Universal Declaration, representatives from Islamic states opposed
those clauses averse to Islamic traditions, such as polygamy.41
36. See Shannon V. Barrow, Nigerian Justice: Death-by-Stoning Sentence
Reveals Empty Promises to the State and the International Community, 17
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1203–04 (Fall 2003) (vividly describing the stoning ritual).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Rachel A. Ruane, Murder in the Name of Honor: Violence against
Women in Jordan and Pakistan, 14 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1523, 1568 (2000)
(“Increasingly, government actors are using cultural relativist claims to avoid
responsibility for private acts of violence against women.”).
40. Radhika Coomaraswamy, Identity Within: Cultural Relativism, Minority Rights and the Empowerment of Women, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 483,
496 (2002).
41. Jaclyn Ling-Chien Neo, “Anti-God, Anti-Muslim and Anti-Quran”: Expanding the Range of Participants and Parameters in Discourse over Women’s
Rights and Islam in Malaysia, 21 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 29, 37 (2003).
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The Saudi Arabian delegate altogether abstained from the final
vote because he, and many other Muslim leaders, viewed the
Universal Declaration as Western ideology and non-inclusive of
Islamic traditions.42 From this result it is clear that, like genital mutilation, the universalist approach may be similarly ineffective in addressing stoning and other culturally charged human rights abuses.
As was the case with genital mutilation, the relativist approach to stoning is again ineffective and ignores the evolving
nature of culture and religion. A relativist advocate would tolerate stoning as the autonomous religious and cultural practice
of Muslim communities. This approach is largely ineffective
because first, it espouses tolerance to the point of inaction. Second, cultural relativism ignores the malleable and evolving nature of religion and culture. The Muslim religion is in fact
evolving toward intolerance of stoning, and this evolution does
not erode the religion’s authenticity. In fact, many liberal Muslims consider stoning and other forms of violence to be unIslamic.43 For example, Iran enacted a ban on stoning and
many Muslim leaders see the practice as an embarrassment to
the religion, recognizing the need to evolve with social changes.44 Therefore, the relativist approach ignores the legitimate
malleability of religious traditions, and in doing so, may be failing the human rights community, particularly victims of human rights abuses.
The preceding discussion demonstrates the nuances of culturally charged human rights advocacy and the challenges accompanying both universalist and relativist approaches. The
experience of anti-genital mutilation and stoning advocates evidence these difficulties. The preceding discussion also demonstrates the nuances of culturally charged human rights abuses
and the minefield of political incorrectness and cultural backlash facing advocates. Therefore, it is clear that advocates hoping to advocate effectively against culturally charged human
rights abuse must be strategic in their efforts. The remainder
of this Article discusses various advocacy strategies and argues
that regional bodies are best situated to account for the nuances of culturally charged human rights abuses. In particular, the
42. Id.
43. Kielsgard, supra note 34, at 471–72.
44. Id. at 471.
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Caribbean Court of Justice and the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights are the best forums for addressing
LGBTI human rights abuses in the Caribbean.
III. SHORTCOMINGS OF DIRECT ADVOCACY TOWARD LGBTI
HOSTILE STATES
Before discussing the advantages of regional bodies for advancing human rights norms, we must first consider the shortcomings of direct advocacy by international LGBTI advocates
targeting state leaders and homophobic or transphobic agencies
or persons in a country.
International direct advocacy targeting LGBTI hostile actors
often fails for at least two reasons. First, direct advocacy can
be, and often is, readily rejected as cultural imperialism. Consequently, the LGBTI norms being advanced through international direct advocacy are categorically rejected as foreign
norms, alien to the local population. Many LGBTI-hostile
communities consider LGBTI rights advocacy to be a form of
cultural imperialism. For example, Ghanaian government officials have advanced the cultural relativist argument in resistance to LGBTI rights advocacy, claiming “Ghanaians are
unique people whose culture, morality and heritage totally abhor homosexual and lesbian practices and indeed any other
form of unnatural sexual acts.”45 Many Jamaicans also respond
to pressure from LGBTI rights movements by viewing such
demands as “foreign.”46 This perception of cultural imperialism
had real effects for the Caribbean’s LGBTI population when
the United Kingdom Privy Council47 demanded an elimination
of local anti-gay laws.48 Caribbean states refused to comply
with the Privy Council ruling, arguing that homosexuality was

45. Ghana’s Secret Gay Community, BBC (Mar. 14, 2007),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6445337.stm.
46. Nelson, supra note 9, at 255.
47. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is often simply called the
Privy Council. The Privy Council is a part of the House of Lords in London,
England, made up of senior judges who consider appeals from trials in lower
courts. The Privy Council was once the final court of appeal for Englishspeaking Caribbean countries. JAMAICANS FOR JUSTICE, BROCHURE ON THE
PRIVY COUNCIL AND THE PROPOSED CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE (Jun. 5,
2006), http://www.jamaicansforjustice.org.
48. Caribbean
Rejects
UK
Justice,
BBC,
Feb.
15,
2001,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1171362.stm.
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immoral and “against their culture and religions.”49 As such,
LGBTI advocacy aimed directly at local Caribbean populations
has failed and will likely continue to be ineffective in bringing
about actual change.
The second drawback of direct advocacy is its potential to
compromise the efforts of local LGBTI advocates and invite retaliation against local LGBTI communities. Direct advocacy
efforts from the international community targeting local Caribbean populations have a strong potential to muddy the waters
by branding the LGBTI movement as a foreign agenda. Belizean LGBTI advocates suffered exactly this blow just as their advocacy efforts were taking flight in 2012. Local advocates campaigned against the Belizean criminal code, which criminalizes
homosexual conduct.50 Simultaneously, London-based LGBTI
activists launched a campaign targeting Belize and a host of
other states in which consensual same sex conduct was criminalized.51 The local Belizean community quickly took notice of
the foreigners’ presence and launched a vociferous counter
campaign. Religious opponents of the LGBTI movement said
“The people of Belize will not surrender our constitution, our
moral foundations, and our way of life to predatory foreign interests.”52 As a result, the foreigners’ campaign stunted the Belizean LGBTI rights movement by tainting the movement as a
foreign import, rather than a grassroots Belizean effort.
Yet another example of failed direct advocacy occurred in
Jamaica in 2009 when a United States-based LGBTI lobby
group launched a campaign to boycott Jamaican products, such
as Red Stripe Beer.53 The campaign’s purported purpose was to
pressure the Jamaican government to show greater respect for
the rights of sexual minorities.54 The Jamaica Forum for Lesbians, All-Sexuals, and Gays (“J-FLAG”), the nation’s leading advocacy voice for sexual minorities, criticized the boycott as inef49. Id.
50. Owen Bowcott, Global Campaign to Decriminalise Homosexuality to
Kick
off
in
Belize
Court,
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
16,
2011),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/16/global-campaign-decriminalisehomosexuality-belize-court.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Sonia Mitchell, Gays in US ‘Boycott Jamaica,’ GLEANER (Apr. 1,
2009), http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20090401/news/news2.html.
54. See id.
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fective and ignorant to the local dynamic.55 Among other factors, J-FLAG noted that Red Stripe had actually supported the
LGBTI community by withdrawing corporate support for homophobic entertainers.56 In fact, J-FLAG had advised the United States-based campaign against moving forward with the
boycott, but the U.S. activists chose to disregard the interests
of the local LGBTI community.57 In a statement against the
boycott, J-FLAG described the foreign campaign’s toll on local
advocacy efforts:
The misguided targeting of Red Stripe does tremendous damage to a process of change that we began almost 11 years ago.
The boycott call has now left us not only with our persistent
day to day challenges but with a need to engage Red Stripe
and attempt damage control as a result of actions that we did
not take.58

Like the Belizean experience, foreign advocacy directly targeting Jamaica was not only ineffective, but actually reversed the
progress of local LGBTI advocacy efforts.
Although regionally dissimilar, Ugandan LGBTI activists experienced similar setbacks when an Internet hacking group,
Anonymous, hijacked a Ugandan government website and
posted on it a pro-LGBTI message, including:
Your violations of the rights of LGBT people have disgusted
us. ALL people have the right to live in dignity free from the
repression of someone else’s political and religious beliefs.
You should be PROUD of your LGBT citizens, because they
clearly have more balls than you will ever have.59

Val Kalende, a well-known Ugandan LGBTI activist expressed concern for “the manner in which Anonymous claim to
speak on behalf of Uganda LGBT activists with no consultation

55.
56.
57.
58.

See id.
See id.
See id.
JFLAG releases another statement against Boycott Jamaica, BILERCO
PROJECT
(Apr.
15,
2009),
http://www.bilerico.com/2009/04/jflag_releases_another_statement_against.p
hp.
59. Uganda Government Websites Hacked by Anonymous in Defense of Gay
Pride, LGBT Rights, HUFFPOST GAY VOICES (Aug. 16, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/16/uganda-government-websiteshacked-anonymous-gay-rights_n_1789623.html.
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whatsoever.”60 Furthermore, Kalende noted, “Those wellmeaning interventions can cause severe backlash for activists
on the ground.”61 Another online comment criticized the Internet hack because Anonymous “presumed to place themselves—
outsiders with little at stake—as the protector and [defender]
of Uganda’s LGBT community.”62
The experiences of Belizean, Jamaican, and Ugandan LGBTI
advocates demonstrate the limitations of international direct
advocacy aimed at LGBTI hostile states and therefore demand
that foreign advocates employ other advocacy strategies for
supporting local LGBTI rights.
IV. SHORTCOMINGS OF GLOBAL LGBTI HUMAN RIGHTS
ADVOCACY
LGBTI advocacy efforts on the global scale prove ineffective
for the same reasons that universalist approaches generally
come up short—the global LGBTI rights dialogue continues to
be dominated by the few elite voices of Western Europe and the
United States. As a result, global human rights bodies enjoy
limited buy-in from the developing world. The developing
world’s lack of engagement was perhaps first evident in the
drafting of the Universal Declaration. The Saudi Arabian delegate to the U.N. criticized the Universal Declaration for including “only the standards [recognized] by Western civilization.”63
As a result, the Universal Declaration is largely viewed as being comprised of Westernized norms, foreign to the developing
world. Similarly, LGBTI rights advocacy on the global scale
will also receive little buy-in from the developing world, which
already views LGBTI rights to be foreign norms.
V. ADVANTAGES OF USING REGIONAL BODIES TO ADVANCE
LGBTI RIGHTS IN THE CARIBBEAN
Taking account for the above-discussed limitations of direct
LGBTI advocacy and global LGBTI advocacy, regional bodies
60. Hackers Attack Ugandan Government Websites to Protest Homophobia,
(Aug.
15,
2012),
ADVOCATE.COM
http://www.advocate.com/politics/2012/08/15/hackers-attack-ugandangovernment-websites-protest-homophobia.
61. Id.
62. How Not to Support LGBT People of Uganda, BOX TURTLE BULLETIN
(Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.boxturtlebulletin.com/2012/08/16/47720.
63. Ling-Chien Neo, supra note 41, at 37.
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are more suitable forums for advancing LGBTI rights for at
least four reasons. First, the lower membership rates of regional bodies substantially reduce collective action obstacles and
therefore allow state participants to reach consensus agreements more quickly. Second, cultural similarities among regional neighbors make it easier for neighboring states within a
region to reach a consensus agreement for moving forward with
human rights progress. Third, participants in regional bodies
enjoy more equitable power dynamics, which in turn creates a
more balanced power dynamic for collectively bargaining for
human rights advances. Finally, the geographic accessibility
and low transaction costs of regional bodies allow local LGBTI
communities to play a more instrumental role in advocating for
the human rights protections that affect their lives.
A. Collective Action Obstacles Are Substantially Reduced with
the Lower Number of State Participants
Regional organizations necessarily enjoy a smaller membership pool than global bodies, such as the United Nations. This
lower membership renders regional bodies more ideal for advancing culturally sensitive human rights advocacy. Legal
scholars have long studied the collective action obstacles associated with large group involvement. There are at least three
easily identifiable advantages of using smaller regional bodies
instead of larger, global organizations to advance culturally
charged human rights. First, fewer participants mean fewer
voices at the negotiating table and therefore fewer interests
that must be reconciled to produce a consensus result. Particularly with regard to policy decisions, the presence of fewer participants implies less discordance among member opinions and
therefore a greater probability of reaching an agreement.64
Second, organizations with fewer members experience lower
rates of free ridership. The term free rider refers to a participant who fails to contribute to the group’s work, but nonethe-

64. See Jed S. Ela, Law and Norms in Collective Action: Maximizing Social
Influence to Minimize Carbon Emissions, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 93, 97
(2009) (“[W]hen it comes to social norms solving collective action problems, it
seems that size matters: smaller groups are better, while the largest ones
may be hopeless.”).
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less benefits from the group’s progress.65 In smaller groups, the
participation and contribution of individuals is more readily
apparent and measurable.66 Therefore, in smaller groups,
members are more likely to genuinely participate and contribute to the organization’s mission. Smaller membership rates
also boost the ability of members to coerce noncompliant members into complying.67
Although the notion of freeriding is typically discussed in the
realm of international trade or security,68 it is also possible to
have free riding in the human rights arena. An emerging consensus recognizes that respect for human rights norms cultivates measures of stability, such as conflict-prevention and
market participation.69 Accordingly, the failure to uphold human rights norms while benefiting from the resultant stability
of other states’ compliance constitutes a form of free riding.70
Therefore, a state’s failure to respect LGBTI rights, while enjoying the stability it cultivates is a form of free riding. A very
concrete example of this exists in immigration law. Some
LGBTI-friendly states grant refuge to individuals who suffered
persecution on the basis of their LGBTI status.71 The home
countries from which these persecuted individuals are driven
indirectly benefit from the receiving country’s respect for

65. A “free rider” is someone who “obtains an economic benefit at another’s
expense without contributing to it.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 676 (7th ed.
1999)
66. See Jonathan Cannon, Checking in on the Chesapeake: Some Questions
of Design, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 1131, 1141 (2006). See also Tom Laughlin,
Evaluating New Federalism Arguments in the Area of the Environment: The
Search for Empirical Measures, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 481, 484 (2005).
67. Id.
68. For example, non-participating states free ride (i.e., benefit from without contributing to) international trade and security measures. See, e.g.,
Kenneth Anderson, United Nations Collective Security and the United States
Security Guarantee in an Age of Rising Multipolarity: The Security Council as
the Talking Shop of the Nations, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 55, 68 (2009) (discussing
the free-ridership problem facing NATO).
69. Timothy K. Kuhner, Human Rights Treaties in U.S. Law: The Status
Quo, Its Underlying Bases, and Pathways for Change, 13 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 419, 452 n.167 (2003).
70. Id.
71. See generally Nicole LaViolette, ‘UNHCR Guidance Note on Refugee
Claims relating to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity’: A Critical Commentary, 22 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 173 (2010).
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LGBTI rights. In this sense, the home country free rides on the
LGBTI rights compliance of other nations.
This and other manifestations of human rights free riding are
less likely in smaller groups, which are better able to monitor
compliance.72 For this reason, smaller, regional bodies are more
ideal for advancing LGBTI rights advocacy, as compared with
universal bodies such as the United Nations.
Third, smaller groups enjoy lower transaction costs and
members perceive greater rewards than do members of larger
groups.73 Even at first glance, the logistical cost of organizing
the international community far exceeds the costs of organizing
the members of a regional group. These costs include communication expenses, such as telephone costs and in-person conferences, which are typically lower when states need only travel to
neighboring countries, as opposed to the U.N. headquarters.
With regard to the perceived benefits, members of smaller
groups also perceive a greater stake in the outcome of the negotiations because there are fewer participants.74 Therefore,
smaller groups generally enjoy greater success in reaching policy agreements and this likelihood of success can be employed to
the advantage of international human rights advocacy. Looking
specifically to the various regional organizations that are
available to advocates attempting to advance LGBTI rights in
the Caribbean, we can consider the Organization of American
States (“OAS”) and CARICOM. The OAS boasts the participation of all thirty-five independent countries of the Americas.75
CARICOM enjoys the participation of twenty members and associate members.76 The OAS is headquartered in Washington,
D.C., and has as its judicial arm the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR”).77 CARICOM’s judicial organ
is the Caribbean Court of Justice (“CCJ” or “Caribbean Court”),
72. Jonathan Turley, Transnational Discrimination and the Economics of
Extraterritorial Regulation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 339, 356 (May 1990).
73. Id.
74. Laughlin, supra note 66, at 484.
75. See ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, Who We Are,
http://www.oas.org/en/about/member_states.asp (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
76. See CARICOM Member States, CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY (CARICOM)
SECRETARIAT,
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/member_states.jsp?menu=community
(last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
COMMISSION
ON
HUMAN
RIGHTS,
77. INTER-AMERICAN
http://www.cidh.oas.org/DefaultE.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
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discussed in more detail in Part VI below. Therefore, for our
discussion, the IACHR and CCJ are most relevant. Given their
focus on human rights and their lower membership rates, these
bodies present more ideal forums for advancing LGBTI rights,
compared with the U.N.
B. Regional Similarities Make it Easier to Negotiate Common
Ground and Reach Human Rights Agreements
Although the sheer numbers speak to the advantage of
smaller regional bodies, the sociocultural commonalities among
regional neighbors also render regional bodies more amenable
to reaching culturally charged agreements. Similarities in ethnic, cultural, and religious beliefs, as well as shared histories
and socio-political resemblances bolster the capacity of regional
neighbors to reach agreements, especially regarding culturally
charged matters such as LGBTI rights. In the Caribbean, the
religious and legal similarities of the region’s states are particularly relevant.
The shared colonial history of Caribbean countries is an appropriate starting point. With regard to LGBTI rights, this
shared colonial history brought a shared inheritance of homophobic laws. As of 2008, more than eighty nations criminalized
consensual homosexual conduct and more than half of these
countries inherited their anti-sodomy laws from former colonial
powers.78 The specific provision at issue here is Section 377 of
the British penal code, which states:
Unnatural offences: Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or
animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with
imprisonment of either description for term which may extend
to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.79

Section 377 was “a colonial attempt to set standards of behavior, both to reform the colonized and to protect the colonizers against moral lapses.”80 It became a model penal code for
the British territories, influencing Asia, the Pacific Islands, Africa, and almost all former British colonial territories.81 Many
of these British territorial laws went as far as to prescribe
78.
79.
80.
81.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THIS ALIEN LEGACY, supra note 7, at 4–5.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 5.
Id.
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death for sodomy.82 Although the penal systems of the respective territories of the British Empire varied somewhat, most
are rooted in Section 377 and homophobic laws persisted even
after countries gained independence from the British Empire.83
Ironically, some Caribbean cultures generally deride remnants
of colonialism, but nonetheless embrace their colonial penal
laws “as if the colonial masters were still looking on, as if to
convey legitimate claims to being civilized.”84
Alongside the legislative legacy of colonialism came a religious legacy. This religious, primarily Christian, legacy is especially relevant in light of the faith-based justifications for homophobia. Colonial powers forcefully used religion as a means of
subordinating the peoples of the Caribbean and other colonized
territories. Not only was Christianity imposed upon Caribbean
peoples, but in fact, their African-based religions were actively
persecuted as an integral part of the Trans-Atlantic slave
trade.85 For example, in Haiti, African magic was strictly prohibited under colonial order, which drove the Voodoo religion
underground; it was practiced at night to avoid punishment.86
Slaves found practicing Voodoo were subject to beating, hanging, or imprisonment.87 Additionally, legislation in Barbados
imposed execution or exile for the practice of African religions
until the nineteenth century.88 The religious oppression and
forced conversion to Christianity has severely disadvantaged
the LGBTI population of the Caribbean. Some historians have
noted that particularly in the former British territories, “Christian-based homophobia has damaged many cultures in which
sexual contacts and relationships between men and between
women used to be tolerated and even accepted.”89 For example,
82. John D’Emilio, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF
HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940–1970, at 14 (2d ed.
1983).
83. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HATED TO DEATH: HOMOPHOBIA,
VIOLENCE AND JAMAICA’S HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC 6 (2004).
84. Nelson, supra note 9, at 260–61.
85. Danielle Boaz, Introducing Religious Reparations: Repairing the Perceptions of African Religions Through Expansions in Education, 26 J.L. &
RELIGION 213, 216–18 (2010–2011).
86. Id. at 218.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. James D. Wilets, International Human Rights Law and Sexual Orientation, 18 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 5–6 n.8 (1994).
A
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in Uganda, now notorious for homophobic violence, many
Ugandans have reported that homosexuality has been historically tolerated in their villages.90
It should also be noted that Christian influences are not entirely distinct from the colonial legislative legacy. In fact, the
Christian Bible largely laid the foundation for British common
law91 and continues to influence perceptions of homosexuality.92 Judicial decision making, as recently as the latenineteenth century, deferred to Christianity as the source of
law.93 The legal term “sodomy” is itself a Biblical reference to
the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah, which were allegedly destroyed by God as an act of purging sexual deviation.94
It is important to note here that although indigenous forms of
homophobia may have predated colonialism, documentation
and historical records evidencing historical indigenous homophobia remain elusive. Moreover, the earliest record of homophobia may be the homophobia espoused by slave-owners who
incentivized heterosexuality for the profitable purpose of procreation to produce more slaves. Even this early homophobia is
sourced in colonialism and is not indigenous to the Caribbean.95
Therefore, without concrete evidence of indigenous homophobia, this Article assumes that homophobia is not indigenous to
the Caribbean.
The benefits of regional, cultural, and religious similarities
became evident in Brazil’s 2003 attempt to pass a Resolution
on Human Rights and Sexual Orientation in the U.N. Commis-

90. Jeffrey Gettleman, Remembering David Kato, a Gay Ugandan and a
Marked
Man,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
29,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/30/weekinreview/30gettleman.html.
91. James Wilets, Conceptualizing Private Violence Against Sexual Minorities as Gendered Violence: An International and Comparative Law Perspective, 60 ALB. L. REV. 989, 1028 (1997) (“In Asia and Africa the extensive list of
countries with sodomy laws can be traced back to the lingering effects of colonialism and Christianity, Islam, and Marxist-Leninism.”).
92. See Andrew H. Friedman, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right to Privacy: Abandoning Scriptural, Canonical, and Natural Law Based Definitions of
Marriage, 35 HOW. L.J. 173, 179–87 (1992) (discussing the heavy influence of
Christian philosophers on Anglo-American law).
93. David A. Skeel, Jr., The Paths of Christian Legal Scholarship, 12
GREEN BAG 2D 169, 170 (2009).
94. See Genesis 19:1–38.
95. Nelson, supra note 9, at 258.
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sion on Human Rights (“The Brazil Resolution”).96 The Brazil
Resolution simply reaffirmed preexisting international legal
rights for sexual minorities; it did not seek to add any new
rights to existing international jurisprudence. The resolution
expressed “deep concern at the occurrence of violations of human rights all over the world against persons based on . . .
their sexual orientation,” and stressed that “human rights and
fundamental freedoms . . . should not be hindered in any way
on the grounds of sexual orientation.”97
The global discord on LGBTI rights was one of the primary
forces causing the demise of the resolution. Islamic and Christian-influenced states, including the Holy See, formed a vociferous alliance opposing the measure based on religious
grounds.98 Therefore, Brazil’s attempt to establish a global
LGBTI rights instrument failed largely because of the religious
discord of the world’s nations. Regions like the Caribbean do
not experience such religious diversity and are therefore better
able to reach an agreement on LGBTI rights without having to
overcome such extreme religious diversity.
The Caribbean’s shared sociocultural characteristics enhance
the region’s ability to reach consensus LGBTI human rights
agreements for at least two reasons. First, Caribbean states
experience largely the same contemporary cultural manifestations of homophobia—homophobic music and mob violence. The
shared homophobic indicators allow advocates to narrowly tailor human rights strategies to address the region’s shared social ills. The myriad and diverse homophobic manifestations
occurring worldwide force international advocates to take a
more dilute, broad-based or catchall advocacy approach in order to address all forms of homophobia. The particularized homophobic expressions of the Caribbean allow advocates to narrowly tailor their efforts to address these specific social expressions and thereby design and execute a more effective LGBTI
rights campaign. A regional advocacy strategy that employs
bodies such as the Inter-American Commission on Human
96. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, RESOLUTION ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION
HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (Apr. 25, 2003), http://www.iglhrc.org/binarydata/ATTACHMENT/file/000/000/213-1.pdf.
97. Id.
98. Timothy Garvey, God v. Gays? The Rights of Sexual Minorities in International Law as Seen Through the Doomed Existence of the Brazilian Resolution, 38 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 659, 670–71 (2010).
AND
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Rights and the Caribbean Court can dedicate itself exclusively
to targeting homophobic music and violence. Whereas an international body, like the U.N., is forced to cast a wider, more dilute strategic net, in order to address the many sources and
manifestations of worldwide homophobia.
In addition to the contemporary expressions of homophobia,
the Caribbean’s shared colonial legacy of anti-sodomy laws presents another, more historic and entrenched, common denominator. At first glance, the region’s anti-sodomy laws paint a
dismal picture for LGBTI advocates. However, the imperialistic
source of the laws can and has been employed as an advocacy
strategy. Time and again, J-FLAG and other advocacy groups
strive to raise local awareness of the culturally imperialistic
nature of the laws—demonstrating that these laws, far from
indigenous, were actually implanted by the former British rulers. Therefore, the region’s shared source of anti-sodomy laws
offers advocates the opportunity to take a tailored approach to
address the singular root of the region’s homophobic laws—the
British imperial legacy.
C. Regional Bodies Enjoy More Equitable Power Dynamics,
Which Promote Collective Bargaining
The vast power differential among the world’s nations creates
a coercive environment in which to conduct global negotiations
regarding human rights. Regions, however, especially Latin
America and the Caribbean, enjoy greater socioeconomic likeness. To understand the gravity of global economic disparity,
one need only consider that the world’s richest 250 persons control as much wealth as the world’s poorest 2.5 billion.99 Consider also that economic disparity between countries has increased in the last century.100 One measure of global socioeconomic disparity is the United Nations Development Program’s
(“UNDP”) Human Development Indicator (“HDI”).101 The HDI

99. Mark A. Drumbl, Poverty, Wealth, and Obligation in International Environmental Law, 76 TUL. L. REV. 843, 903 (2002).
100. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, GLOBALIZATION: THREAT OR
OPPORTUNITY?
(Apr.
12,
2000),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041200to.htm. See also Drumbl,
supra note 99, at 903.
101. FRANCES P. HADFIELD, RECENT CUSTOMS LITIGATION DEVELOPMENTS AND
THEIR IMPACT ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE n.3 (Feb. 25, 2010), available
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of a nation is a composite measure of life expectancy, educational attainment, and income.102 The HDI is considered a
breakthrough measurement because of its capacity to represent
both social and economic development in a single statistic.103
Even a cursory look at the UNDP’s graphical representation of
the world’s HDIs shows that the world’s nations vary widely in
socioeconomic progress (see Appendix I). However, the HDI
trends for Latin American and Caribbean nations seem to progress in lockstep, resulting in a more balanced socioeconomic
power dynamic (see Appendix II). The Latin AmericanCaribbean region enjoys far less economic disparity as compared with the world.
Latin America and the Caribbean’s socioeconomic similarities
make the region a better forum for LGBTI advocacy because it
enjoys a more level playing field. In contrast, the stark power
differences between the world’s nations undermines global human rights advocacy in at least two respects. First, less powerful, developing nations have little or no ability to enforce compliance. Second, developing nations do not enjoy the same level
of participation in the international norm-development process
due to structural biases. These two factors weaken whatever
human rights advances global bodies are able to achieve.
Regarding non-compliance, global human rights mechanisms
subject developing nations to enforcement by more powerful
countries, but leave these nations toothless to demand compliance by powerful countries. With developing countries making
up the majority of the world’s states, scholars have noted the
clear dysfunction of a system that deprives the majority of
members from obtaining compliance from other members.104
For example, the United States often promotes the enforcement
of treaties abroad, but refuses to demand compliance within its
own borders.105 Note also that smaller bodies are better able to
at 2010 WL 956091 (defining the Human Development Index as a measure of
quality of life around the world on a scale from 0 (low) to 1 (high)).
102. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
INDEX (HDI), http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
103. Id.
104. Renê Guilherme S. Medrado, Renegotiating Remedies in the WTO: A
Multilateral Approach, 22 WIS. INT’L L.J. 323, 325 (2004).
105. William M. Carter, Jr., The Mote in Thy Brother’s Eye: A Review of
Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 496, 510
(2002).
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detect non-compliance and police its membership into conformity.106 Therefore, regional bodies have greater policing capacity
as a result of both their socioeconomic similarities as well as
their smaller membership size.
In addition to heightened police power, regional bodies enjoy
greater buy-in from their states parties, due largely to fewer
bureaucratic obstacles that often hinder small-country participation on the global scale. Consider, for example, the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”), which enjoys a membership of
153 nations.107 As of 2004, not a single country designated as
“least developed” had sought to resolve a trade dispute using
the WTO’s dispute settlement system.108 This low participation
rate from developing countries is not because these countries
do not need the settlement process, it is due to the structural
difficulties posed by an organization of such vast magnitude.109
Regional bodies, such as the IACHR and Caribbean Court, pose
fewer bureaucratic obstacles to developing nations and are
more accessible and promising avenues for human rights advocacy.
Therefore, regional bodies are more advantageous for advancing LGBTI rights because these bodies enjoy a more balanced
power dynamic, which fosters greater compliance enforcement
and these bodies are also more accessible to developing states.
D. Regional Bodies Give the Domestic LGBTI Community a
Greater Voice in the Movement Toward LGBTI Equality
Regional bodies, more localized in nature, are more advantageous for furthering LGBTI rights because local bodies allow
LGBTI persons themselves to play a more central role in advancing global LGBTI equality. This notion is based simply on
the principle of proportionality—the fewer members a group
has, the greater proportion of the group’s decision is credited to
each player. Accordingly, smaller regional bodies give LGBTI
106. Noah Bialostozky, Overcoming Collective Action Failure in the Security
Council: Would Direct Regional Representation Better Protect Universal Human Rights?, 15 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 12–13, 22 (2009).
107. Understanding the WTO: The Organization—Members and Observers,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited
Oct. 7, 2012).
108. Medrado, supra note 104, at 324.
109. Id. at 325.
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communities a proportionally larger stake in the bodies’ decision-making. This amplified role of local stakeholders—
including homophobic stakeholders—is necessary to ensure a
successful and sustainable human rights campaign.
The importance of local stakeholder involvement came to
light in the global campaign to end female circumcision in some
African communities. Anti-circumcision campaigns have largely failed because they neglect to incorporate domestic African
stakeholders.110 Without consulting the local stakeholders, anti-circumcision campaigns effectively alienate the communities
that engage in the practice and therefore create a confrontational and ineffective dynamic between the advocates and the
targeted communities.111
In a very concrete sense, the engagement of states and local
populations is integral to furthering culturally charged human
rights advocacy, such as LGBTI rights. The failure of the Brazil
Resolution, discussed in Part V.b. above, was partially due to
Brazil’s failure to engage with states prior to its introduction.
Brazil introduced the resolution in the final days of the Human
Rights Commission’s 2003 session, with virtually no prior
warning to member states.112 A number of states, who might
otherwise have supported the instrument, abstained from the
voting process simply because they had not been engaged in
the drafting process.113 Had Brazil introduced the instrument
to a regional body, engaging the region’s most relevant states
for LGBTI advocacy as well as engaging the LGBTI populations of those states, the resolution may have enjoyed greater
success. Therefore, the LGBTI advocacy community risks similar alienation and eventual demise if the Caribbean’s LGBTI
hostile states and LGBTI communities are not engaged in the
advocacy process.
To briefly conclude, the smaller size and local nature of regional bodies render them more accessible to local stakeholders
and therefore establish more promising avenues for pursuing
community-centered advocacy strategies toward LGBTI equality in the Caribbean. Through a community-centered approach,
110. Chi Mgbako, Meghna Saxena, Anna Cave, Nasim Farjad & Helen
Shin, Penetrating the Silence in Sierra Leone: A Blueprint for the Eradication
of Female Genital Mutilation, 23 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 111, 112–13 (2010).
111. Id.
112. Garvey, supra note 98, at 670.
113. Id.
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LGBTI advocates can avoid alienating the relevant local community and therefore engage in a more interactive and promising dialogue and proceed more effectively toward LGBTI equality.
VI. THE INSULARISM PROBLEM
Perhaps the most common, and anticipated, counterargument against this Article lies in the potential immunity that
accompanies regionalism. Specifically, if LGBTI rights are left
to the regional realm, there may be no internal pressure to enact and enforce LGBTI rights, particularly within a relatively
homophobic region. In this respect, opponents of regionalism
may argue that only global strategies can counteract regional
homophobia.
However, the Caribbean experience with human rights norm
development does not indicate a threat of insularism. The Caribbean Court’s death penalty jurisprudence speaks to the issue
of regional insularism. The Caribbean Court, created in 2001,
is an independent adjudicatory body governed by the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice.114 The
Court’s very purpose centered on breaking away from the United Kingdom Privy Council, which was the final court of appeals
for English-speaking Caribbean countries.115 Caribbean citizens and politicians viewed the establishment of the CCJ as a
symbolic breakaway from the former colonial power.116 For
many, the CCJ symbolized the “end of the final vestiges of colonialism” in the English-speaking Caribbean.117 Another major
impetus for the Court’s formation was the Privy Council’s decision in Pratt and Morgan v. Attorney General for Jamaica, in
which the Privy Council held that a prolonged delay in issuing
appellate decisions in death penalty cases was unlawful.118 The
Pratt decision was the first of a line of Privy Council decisions
114. About
the
CCJ,
CARIBBEAN
CT.
JUST.,
http://http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/about-the-ccj (last visited Oct. 7,
2012).
115. JAMAICANS FOR JUSTICE, supra note 47.
116. Leonard Birdsong, Formation of the Caribbean Court of Justice: the
Sunset of British Colonial Rule in the English Speaking Caribbean, 36 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 197, 200 (2005).
117. Id. at 200–01.
118. Pratt & Morgan v. Attorney General for Jamaica, [1993], 3 W.L.R. 995
(Jam.).
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critical of the Caribbean’s death penalty record.119 Therefore,
when the CCJ was formed in the interest of fostering regional
autonomy, human rights advocates feared that the CCJ would
amount to no more than a “hanging court,” to delegitimize the
Privy Council’s anti-death penalty jurisprudence.120 For human
rights advocates, the CCJ represented the region’s “antidote to
the Privy Council’s supposed hostility towards the death penalty.”121 It was therefore surprising when the CCJ, in one of its
very first decisions, upheld a challenge to the death penalty, in
what appeared to be the same tradition of the Privy Council.122
Therefore, regionalism in the Caribbean does not appear to
have fallen prey to any insularism that would permit unfettered human rights abuses.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
This Article concludes that regional bodies are more advantageous for culturally charged human rights advocacy and
more uniquely tailored for LGBTI rights advocacy in the Caribbean. Taking account for this conclusion, the next few paragraphs make three recommendations to LGBTI advocacy communities seeking to advance LGBTI rights in the region.
A. Strengthen the Democratic Mechanisms Available to the Caribbean LGBTI Community
Progress within the Latin American community is largely
credited to the utilization of “democratic openings.”123 Together
with Latin America’s example, the earlier discussed advantages of working within smaller, more similar regional
groups, suggest that LGBTI advocates may realize substantial
progress by strengthening the democratic mechanisms already

119. Margaret A. Burnham, Indigenous Constitutionalism and the Death
Penalty: the Case of the Commonwealth Caribbean, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 582,
587 (2005).
120. Caribbean
Rejects
UK
Justice,
BBC
(Feb.
15,
2001),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1171362.stm.
121. Phillip Dayle, Caribbean Court of Justice: A Model for International
GUARDIAN
(Sept.
10,
2010),
Courts?,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2010/sep/10/caribbean-court-judges-selection.
122. Id.
123. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 34.
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available to the Caribbean’s LGBTI population. These mechanisms include the OAS, IACHR, CARICOM,124 and the CCJ.125
LGBTI advocates may consider bolstering the resources
available to these bodies, whose missions include providing an
example of independent judicial decision making that is “worthy of emulation by the courts of the region.”126 By supporting
the independence of the IACHR and Caribbean Court, advocates can improve at least two avenues available for the Caribbean’s LGBTI community seeking redress from homophobic
human rights violations.
With regard to the relative value of supporting the IACHR
and the Caribbean Court, the Caribbean Court is more advantageous in at least two respects. First, it enjoys closer geographic and cultural proximity to the population at issue, the
Caribbean LGBTI community. Second, unlike the IACHR, the
Caribbean Court exercises both original and appellate jurisdiction. The IACHR is generally a forum of last resort, with the
exception of certain types of cases.
B. Provide Greater Resources for LGBTI Individuals Seeking
Redress in Regional Courts
On the other side of litigation, LGBTI advocates can also
support the Caribbean’s LGBTI population by lending resources to individuals or groups attempting to access the
Courts (either the IACHR or the Caribbean Court). A recent
Human Rights Watch report notes that resource-shortage is a
major obstacle for the Caribbean’s LGBTI population.127 For
example, many domestic groups lack “resources to support
lawyer’s fees.”128 External support can take a range of forms,
including development and distribution of “how to” manuals for
individuals petitioning the courts that include procedural

124. See
Caribbean
Community
(CARICOM)
Secretariat,
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/member_states.jsp?menu=community
(last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
125. CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/
(last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
126. Annual Report 2008/2009, CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 2
http://chooseavirb.com/ccj/wp-content/uploads/annualreports/2008-9/1Mission&Vision.pdf.
127. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 42.
128. Id.
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guidelines for litigating in international courts and indexes of
international case-law relevant to LGBTI rights litigation.
For those advocates seeking a more interactive role in LGBTI
litigation, there are many opportunities for lending pro bono
legal assistance. Several organizations already exist for the
very purpose of connecting attorneys with communities in the
developing world.129 Pro bono legal assistance in the researching and drafting of court filings would certainly be helpful to
the Caribbean’s LGBTI populations who may not have access
to expensive legal resources. Legal support can even occur
more independently, with the filing of amici curiae briefs in
support of existing cases being heard by the Courts. Logistically, advocates may also raise financial support for the LGBTI
community to assist with the travel costs and other expenses
associated with international litigation.
Although advocates may consider supporting information
campaigns aimed at raising awareness about the Commission
and the CCJ, such an effort should be pursued cautiously. A
public information campaign by foreigners supporting these
bodies risks associating the bodies with foreigners and therefore stripping the Commission and CCJ of their domestic advantages. Therefore, with the exception of the information
campaign, support for individuals petitioning regional bodies
presents a promising avenue for foreign LGBTI advocates to
support the efforts of the Caribbean’s LGBTI community.
C. Collaborate More Closely with the Caribbean’s LGBTI Population
Finally, the most crucial element in LGBTI advocacy toward
the Caribbean is the engagement of the Caribbean’s LGBTI
community in the planning phase of advocacy strategies geared
toward improving their livelihoods. The engagement of the domestic population offers advocates a window into the cultural
nuances that must be considered in designing an effective human rights campaign. For an example of the benefits of local
involvement we can turn our attention once more to the case of
129. See,
e.g.,
LAWYERS
WITHOUT
BORDERS,
http://www.lawyerswithoutborders.org/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 7,
NATIONAL
LAWYERS
GUILD
INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE,
2012);
http://www.nlginternational.org/news/article.php?nid=393 (last visited Oct. 7,
2012).
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female circumcision. A Texan, Mollie Melching, designed a successful advocacy program toward abolishing female circumcision in Senegal.130 Before designing the program, Melching
lived in Senegal for twenty-three years.131 During her incountry residency, Melching consulted hundreds of communities and finally found that story-telling and proverbs were an
ideal avenue for advancing her cause.132 Melching’s program is
conducted in Wolof, the local language, and is run by Senegalese citizens.133 The campaign does not directly criticize female
circumcision, but instead emphasizes the health risks associated with the practice.134 The program’s success is self-evident:
thirty-one Senegalese villages now renounce female circumcision and the campaign is being implemented in another 250
communities.135 Melching has since been invited to develop
similar programs in other parts of West Africa.136
Melching’s experience evidences that there is a role for foreign advocates in the advancement of culturally charged human rights. However, her experience also confirms that engagement with the target community is crucial to designing a
campaign that is cognizant of the cultural undertones that
must be accounted for, if the campaign is to be effective.
CONCLUSION AND LIMITS OF THE RESEARCH
The conclusions drawn here are subject to at least three limitations. The first limitation concerns the enforcement of LGBTI
rights norms. At the moment, the enforcement powers of the
Caribbean Court and the IACHR remain unclear. Therefore,
use of these regional bodies to advance LGBTI rights may be
undermined by the bodies’ inability to enforce its rulings. Note,
however, that the enforcement powers of international bodies,
such as the U.N., are also uncertain. Therefore, the regional
bodies’ lack of enforcement power may not necessarily be prejudicial, especially in light of the U.N.’s shared shortcoming.
130. Bowman, supra note 25, at 159.
131. Id.
132. NPR All Things Considered: Female Circumcision Educators, NPR
(July
22,
1998)
http://www.npr.org/programs/atc/archives/1998/980722.atc.html.
133. Bowman, supra note 25, at 158.
134. Id. at 159.
135. Dillon, supra note 24, at 305.
136. Bowman, supra note 25, at 159.
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Second, the term LGBTI has been used very loosely throughout this Article. Although the LGBTI community is the focus of
this research, discrimination against the LGBTI population is
understood to reflect a broader sentiment of hate toward sexual
minorities. The LGBTI population, its sub-communities, and
offshoots, make up a diverse body with diverse interests and
needs. Therefore, the conclusions drawn here may not necessarily be generalizable to all sexual minorities.
Finally, the recommendations made are not intended to be
exhaustive of all avenues available to advocates using regional
bodies to advance LGBTI rights.
Taking account for the above limitations, this research concludes that, relative to global advocacy and direct advocacy,
regional bodies are more advantageous for promoting culturally
charged human rights norms. More narrowly, bodies such as
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the
Caribbean Court of Justice are more advantageous for LGBTI
rights advocacy in the Caribbean.
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